Arizona State Prison-Kingman
Riots Assessment

P = Professionalism: Modeling the idea
R = Responsibility: Owning your actions
I = Integrity: Doing the right thing
C = Courage: Taking action despite fear
E = Efficiency: Making every action count
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On July 1, 2015, at approximately 6:10 p.m., a riot occurred at the Cerbat Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The inmates attacked five staff members and one inmate, and severely damaged numerous staff offices and officer stations.

On July 2, 2015, and again on July 4, 2015, a riot occurred at the Hualapai Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The inmates severely damaged four of the five housing units to the point of rendering them uninhabitable.

The magnitude of the destruction of property required the emergency relocation of 1202 inmates to other prisons and numerous county jails: 40 inmates from the Cerbat Unit and 1162 inmates from the Hualapai Unit.

Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Director Charles L. Ryan assembled a multi-disciplinary team of subject matter experts to conduct a comprehensive investigation of the circumstances precipitating these riots, and the investigation commenced pursuant to the direction of Governor Douglas A. Ducey.

Over the course of its investigation, the ADC Assessment Team conducted approximately 300 interviews with MTC employees and approximately 400 inmates, and reviewed thousands of pages of MTC documents. The most significant findings of fact include:

● An MTC culture of disorganization, disengagement, and disregard of ADC policies and fundamental inmate management and security principles;

● MTC failure to conduct critical staff training and substantial dilution and compression of contractually mandated staff training, and its withholding of these failures and deficiencies from ADC;

● MTC failure to promptly and effectively quell the riots allowed the inmate rampage and property destruction to continue for many more hours;

● The targeted destruction of MTC property, together with the near absence of destruction of inmate personal property and the absence of inmate-on-inmate violence, strongly suggest that the riots were more likely precipitated by inmate dissatisfaction with MTC’s operation of the prison than by anger among the inmates themselves;

● Over one-third of MTC performance deficiencies identified five years earlier following the escape of three inmates from the same facility were identified again by the ADC Assessment Team.
SUBSTANTIVE SUMMARY

On July 1, 2015, at approximately 6:10 p.m., a riot occurred at the Cerbat Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The Incident Command System (ICS) was activated due to the aggravated assault of an inmate, the subsequent aggravated assault of five staff members, and the rioting that followed these assaults. The MTC Designated Armed Response Team (DART) and Tactical Support Unit (TSU) responded to the riot, joined by the ADC Winslow Tactical Support Unit, the Mohave County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS), and local ambulance providers. The inmates broke windows and destroyed surveillance cameras, and severely damaged numerous staff offices and officer stations.

On July 2, 2015, and again on July 4, 2015, a riot occurred at the Hualapai Unit of the Arizona State Prison in Kingman operated by private contractor Management & Training Corporation (MTC). The riot spread throughout multiple buildings and rendered four of the five housing units uninhabitable. This subsequent riot triggered the immediate deployment of six of the remaining nine ADC Tactical Support Units from Lewis, Perryville, Tucson, Safford, Florence, Eyman, Douglas, Yuma, and Phoenix.

On July 3, 2015, Arizona Department of Corrections Director Charles L. Ryan declared an emergency pursuant to A.R.S. § 41-1609(E)(2) and notified Governor Douglas A. Ducey and Attorney General Mark Brnovich of the need to relocate inmates to other facilities. ADC subsequently relocated 1202 inmates to other prisons and numerous county jails: 40 inmates from the Cerbat Unit and 1162 inmates from the Hualapai Unit.

An ADC Assessment Team assembled by Director Ryan, and pursuant to the direction of Governor Ducey, conducted a comprehensive investigation of the riots, ultimately completing approximately 300 interviews with MTC employees and approximately 400 inmates, and reviewing thousands of pages of MTC documents.

The scope of the investigation included a thorough analysis of (1) the riots, including the precipitating events and the aftermath, (2) MTC’s operational response to the riots, (3) MTC’s leadership and staff, (4) MTC’s inmate management, supervision, and communication practices, (5) MTC’s training practices for leadership and staff, (6) MTC’s interactions with ADC’s Monitoring Team, and (7) MTC’s performance deficiencies compared to five years earlier following the escape of three inmates from the same facility.

I. The Precipitating Events, The Riots, And The Aftermath.

Cerbat Unit

• Numerous inmates warned MTC staff that a certain African American inmate who had allegedly stolen cell phones and drugs from inmates of other races would be in danger if he was returned to the general population yard so soon after MTC had placed him into investigative detention, ostensibly because the inmates of other races would perceive the alleged thief as not having been sufficiently punished, such that those inmates would seek retribution against him and all African American inmates. Despite these warnings, MTC returned the inmate to the general population yard.
• MTC staff watched as the inmates began grouping by race on the yard at approximately 5:45 p.m. MTC did not activate the Incident Command System (ICS) and did not lock down the unit. At approximately 6:10 p.m., the African American inmate in danger was assaulted by numerous inmates in Housing Unit 9, whereupon MTC activated ICS and the victim-inmate was escorted across the yard to the shift commander’s office. Groups of inmates followed in an attempt to again warn that this inmate must be removed from general population.

• Numerous inmates alleged that the shift commander’s response was inappropriate and unprofessional and was the event which precipitated the riot, including the subsequent aggravated assault of five MTC staff members. The ADC Assessment Team was unable to corroborate these allegations about the nature of the shift commander’s response.

• MTC’s deployment of its DART team was disorganized and hindered by MTC’s informal and undocumented training protocol.

Hualapai Unit

• According to allegations by both inmates and a fellow MTC staff member, in the aftermath of the riot at the Cerbat Unit, an MTC staff member at the Hualapai Unit used excessive and unjustified force in handling an inmate, and this incident allegedly precipitated the initial rioting in Housing Unit 4.

• MTC’s unwillingness or inability to comply with repeated directives from ADC Director Charles Ryan, Acting Offender Operations Division Director Joe Profiri, and Contract Beds Operations Director Tara Diaz to retake control of the inmates and buildings allowed the inmates to continue rioting and destroying property for approximately an additional 6-10 hours.

II. MTC’s Operational Response To The Riots.

• MTC’s failure to effectively communicate and share intelligence allowed an endangered inmate to return to the general population yard and precipitated the riot at the Cerbat Unit.

• MTC’s failure to follow fundamental inmate management and security principles by taking prompt action as soon as MTC staff witnessed the inmates grouping by race on the yard at the Cerbat Unit allowed an otherwise potentially controllable situation to escalate into a full scale riot.

• MTC’s DART team response to the Cerbat Unit riot was inefficient and ineffective as a direct result of MTC’s defective training model which required...
• MTC’s management of the ICS at the Cerbat Unit was disorganized and ineffective and failed to prioritize the physical accounting of all MTC staff. MTC did not account for all civilian and uniformed staff for approximately two hours.

• MTC’s written Emergency Response Plan (ERP) lacked fundamental contact information for local law enforcement and other officials in surrounding communities, and MTC’s command staff did not even know where to find the ERP at the Cerbat Unit.

• When alerted to the rioting at the Hualapai Unit, MTC’s TSU team responded to Housing Unit 4 with inadequate weapons and munitions. Thereafter, MTC was unwilling or unable to comply with repeated directives from ADC to quell the riots, which allowed the inmate rampage and property destruction to continue for many more hours.

• MTC’s TSU commander informed the Warden/Incident Commander and the ADC TSU Commander that he wanted to rest his TSU team before [redacted]. The ADC TSU Commander advised the Warden/Incident Commander that his team could stage a tactical response [redacted]. The MTC Warden/Incident Commander ordered him to stand down. MTC’s Complex Administrator endorsed the Warden’s order. MTC’s inaction further delayed any tactical response to the riots by approximately two hours.

III. MTC’s Leadership And Staff.

• MTC’s disorganized and disengaged approach to inmate management and line staff, and its culture of casual indifference toward staff training, were significant contributing factors which precipitated the riots.

• The ADC Assessment Team was on-site in Kingman for ten days, completing approximately 300 interviews with MTC employees and approximately 400 inmates and reviewing thousands of pages of MTC documents, and was surprised by the willingness and eagerness of many MTC staff members to express their concerns and complaints and overall dissatisfaction with MTC leadership. Four MTC officers waited over one hour after working a twelve hour shift to share their comments. One officer stated that disclosing MTC’s dangerous practices was more important than the risk of being fired for disclosing those practices. The consistent message repeatedly reported to the ADC Assessment Team was that MTC leadership did not value or support the staff. Overall, the MTC workforce reported being exceptionally unhappy with MTC leadership.

• MTC leadership’s failure to instill in its workforce an understanding and appreciation of fundamental inmate management and security principles is pervasive and created over time an institutional culture of apathy and indifference. Inmates as well as MTC staff reported that MTC has a significant number of officers who are either “badge heavy” or who take a disengaged hands-off approach to inmate discipline and enforcement of the rules. Overall, the MTC
workforce and inmates reported many instances of unprofessionalism toward the inmate population.

• One officer posted to the Cerbat Unit contended that MTC leadership had established quotas for the number of inmate disciplinary violations that staff was required to write, which contradicted the Cerbat Unit warden’s oft-reported motto, “Don’t Poke the Bear.” By enforcing the rules one-by-one, rather than taking an overall consistent approach with all inmates and staff, MTC leadership created over time an atmosphere which left the inmates feeling picked on and the staff feeling confused, with both inmates and staff experiencing increasing frustration as a result.

• Many MTC line staff reported that MTC leadership had a practice of transferring officers to another Housing Unit whenever groups of inmates complained that the officer was enforcing the rules, issuing too many disciplinary tickets, or otherwise not responding to their complaints to their satisfaction. The practice was so pervasive that MTC staff coined the phrase “Group Ons” to describe what happened to them before MTC leadership transferred them to another post upon receiving such inmate complaints. This practice empowered the inmates to repeat their behavior and intimidate officers by dictating which officer can work which Housing Unit. The consequence of this practice was the widespread demoralization of MTC staff.

• MTC leadership has no formal briefing system to convey information from supervisors to line staff. Sporadic telephone briefings are poorly attended and ineffective. Leadership briefing sheets are rarely reviewed and wardens either failed to hold the mandatory monthly meetings with officers or held perfunctory meetings that were not operationally meaningful. When such meetings sporadically occur, they are perfunctory and ineffective. MTC’s records reveal that the Chief of Security for the Hualapai Unit has not held a meeting with subordinate supervisory staff since November 2014. Inmates and MTC staff consistently reported that management tours and inspections of the prison were perfunctory and failed to address the needs of both groups.

• MTC leadership failed to prioritize the gathering and sharing of intelligence and failed to properly utilize a dedicated Special Security Unit (SSU) position in the allocated staffing pattern. Although an SSU Investigations Sergeant position is allocated by the contract, MTC assigned the person holding that title to the duties of a training instructor. Although there are supervisors in each Unit who technically are assigned SSU duties in addition to other supervisory responsibilities, these supervisors reported that they dedicated only approximately 45 minutes each day to this critical inmate management and security duty.

• MTC leadership operated the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit as two wholly independent facilities, which resulted in line staff reluctance to work at a Unit to which they were not assigned and Unit wardens not sharing best practices. This fractured operational model is contrary to ADC’s comparative model.
• MTC leadership has mismanaged the mandated overtime of staff, which has led to an exhausted and emotionally burned-out workforce. MTC leadership uses mandatory overtime to fill required staffing posts, and some staff are required to work overtime five days per week while others work overtime only when they volunteer to do so. The facility has a 17% correctional officer vacancy rate.

IV. MTC’s Inmate Management, Supervision, And Communication Practices.

• After the escape of three inmates from this MTC-operated prison in 2010, ADC Director Ryan ordered removed from the facility all minimum and medium custody inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder, or who had a history of escape or attempted escape from a secure perimeter, or who had more than 20 years remaining on their sentence. These restrictions do not apply to other minimum and medium custody facilities. Therefore, with regard to other minimum and medium custody prisons, MTC manages comparatively lower risk inmates.

• At the Cerbat Unit, the total number of disciplinary violation reports for major (felony) and minor (misdemeanor) offenses in June 2015 was comparatively less on a per capita basis than at a substantially similar ADC Unit. MTC disciplinary reports back to April 1, 2015 did not reveal any anomalies between major and minor reports. At the Hualapai Unit, the total number of disciplinary violation reports in June 2015 was only marginally greater than at a substantially similar ADC Unit. There was, however, an unusually high number of major violation reports compared to minor violation reports, and this trend was consistently observed throughout the prior quarter.

• At both the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit, the number of formal inmate grievances was comparatively average to a substantially similar ADC Unit. The predominant grievances involved medical and property issues, which is common. The number of family and friend complaints/inquiries was comparatively average to a substantially similar ADC Unit. Only seven complaints have been received to date for calendar year 2015.

• At both the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit, the detention beds were almost full at the time of the first riot. ADC’s records revealed ADC’s delay in processing some disciplinary and classification actions within policy timeframes required for effective detention management.

• At both the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit, there are mandatory literacy classes and multiple GED classes available. The libraries are relatively large and support education programming. MTC provides multiple career technical education courses taught by certified instructors, as well as life skills courses and substance abuse programs licensed by the Arizona Department of Health Services, and religious services programs for numerous religious groups. Many inmates contended that a significant number of the life skills instructors either were not well trained or just choose to not instruct, thereby relegating them to attending classes where nothing was presented by the instructor.
• MTC records reveal that 59% of the inmates in the Cerbat Unit are employed and 45% of the inmates in the Hualapai Unit are employed. The specific job assignment data, however, reveals an aberrationally high number of building porters and kitchen workers at the Cerbat Unit in comparison to like custody ADC Units.

• The Cerbat Unit has a well-rounded program of recreation activities. Inmate interviews confirmed satisfaction with these programs. Other than a solitary kickball tournament in May 2015, the Hualapai Unit had no other structured recreation activities during the last quarter.

• The MTC case managers and supervisors at the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit fail to meet with inmates on a regular basis and have experienced substantial turnover during the last year, which materially hinders communication with inmates.

• At the Cerbat Unit, inmates reported that MTC staff often used profanities and physical challenges as communication tools. Several African American and Mexican National inmates alleged that MTC gives Caucasian inmates preferential job assignments. A statistical review of MTC’s records indicates that overall jobs provided to inmates before the riot were racially balanced, although a comprehensive review of the specific racial balances between the more preferred jobs and the less preferred jobs indicates at least some degree of a mathematical racial imbalance.

• At the Cerbat Unit, inmates of all races reported that MTC did not issue a lock down directive prior to the commencement of the riot when inmates began grouping by race in the yard.

• At the Hualapai Unit, inmates reported that the lack of supervisor presence on the yards allows “Badge Heavy” officers to abuse their authority, and that the lack of professionalism and the use of profanity further inflame inmate unrest. The ADC Assessment Team corroborated the absence of supervisors on the yard when conducting an inspection of the Unit.

• Inmate allegations of MTC staff’s failure to promptly address their concerns and of a pervasive attitude of disengagement were corroborated by the ADC Assessment Team’s daily inspections of the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit.

• MTC’s failure to conduct critical staff training, and its substantial dilution and compression of contractually mandated staff training, has created over time a workforce with a very limited understanding of prison politics and culture, security threat groups, yard dynamics of inmate hierarchy and code of conduct, intelligence reporting and sharing, interview techniques, and fundamental inmate management and security principles. MTC staff admitted to many of these deficiencies.
V. MTC’s Training Practices For Leadership And Staff.

• MTC withheld from ADC its failure to conduct critical staff training and its substantial dilution and compression of contractually mandated staff training. MTC leadership’s approach to training clearly indicates that staff training is not an MTC priority. MTC drastically reduced critical topic training hours in MTC’s pre-service academy compared to ADC’s academy curriculum, and compressed 60 hours of training into a five day training week. The immediate consequence of MTC’s withholding and failures is the “graduation” of officers from MTC’s training academy who are ill-prepared to work in a prison.

• MTC leadership and staff were unable to articulate why numerous discrepancies existed in the training curriculum and why numerous instructors were not adequately trained to present the curriculum.

• MTC failed to conduct critical DART training for supervisors and failed to offer Supervisor Essentials courses to DART supervisors.

• MTC’s in-service training records for FY15 revealed that 29% of MTC staff had not completed ADC required annual classroom training and 49% had not completed required online training. MTC’s records further revealed that MTC completed 0% of mandated supervisor training for FY15, and that 7 staff weapon qualifications had expired prior to the riots and 27 have expired since the riots.

• Members of MTC’s TSU team reported that the majority of scheduled tactical trainings were never completed due to staffing shortages and other unexplained decisions by MTC leadership. They admitted that they needed cross-training with other ADC tactical units and they expressed a strong desire to rise to the expertise level of ADC tactical units. MTC was unable to produce seven months of training rosters for FY15, and was unable to articulate why its leadership repeatedly cancelled or otherwise failed to schedule this critical tactical training.

• Members of MTC’s TSU team reported that MTC had failed to issue them all of the necessary tactical equipment. They stated that the MTC armory lacked dedicated weapons and that MTC had failed to adequately train them in the use of specialty munitions. [REDACTED] discovered in the aftermath of the riots revealed that [REDACTED], which is compelling evidence of the dangerous consequence of MTC’s failure to conduct critical specialty munitions training of its TSU team. When asked, 66% of MTC’s TSU officers stated that their poor training had failed to adequately prepare them for the riot at the Hualapai Unit.

• MTC failed to implement a Field Training Officer program. The consequence of this failure is that new officers are often trained by officers with minimal experience, and in some instances, by officers with less than one year of field experience.
• MTC staff expressed a strong belief that the promotional process is based on favoritism rather than qualification, with many reporting that MTC leadership follows the “Good Ol’ Boy” system for promotional decisions.

• MTC staff stated that there are serious deficiencies in MTC training, especially in the areas of communication skills and crisis intervention. At ADC’s academy, ADC instructors conduct sixteen hours of critical crisis intervention training, which includes role-playing in real-life scenarios of inmate management. In sharp contrast, at MTC’s academy, MTC dilutes and compresses this critical training down to ninety minutes.

VI. MTC’s Interactions With ADC’s Monitoring Team.

• In their interactions with the on-site ADC Monitoring Team, MTC leadership and staff portray a façade of desired compliance, but the ADC Assessment Team’s investigation reveals that MTC leadership and staff revert to a culture of disengaged non-compliance in the absence of the ADC Monitoring Team.

• MTC employees reported that MTC leadership discourages them from speaking with the ADC Monitoring Team.

• The ADC Monitoring Team monitors only completed training data, not the specific ongoing nature and extent of MTC instruction or the operational effectiveness of that instruction. The ADC Monitoring Team reported that MTC never disclosed that MTC was not conducting critical staff training and had diluted and compressed contractually mandated staff training.

• MTC staff and the inmates did not share with the ADC Monitoring Team before the riots the significant concerns that they shared with the ADC Assessment Team after the riots.

• There is very little discussion during the MTC daily briefings while the ADC Monitoring Team is in the room.

VII. MTC’s Performance Deficiencies In 2015 Compared To 2010.

• ADC’s December 2010 cure notice to MTC identified 31 performance deficiencies and memorialized ADC’s serious concerns regarding major inmate disturbances at the Cerbat Unit and the Hualapai Unit in October 2010.

• In January 2015, the entire inmate population of the Cerbat Unit refused to eat in protest of MTC’s food service operations and two large groupings of inmates were reported in the Hualapai Unit yard.
Over one-third of MTC performance deficiencies identified in 2010 following the escape of three inmates from the same facility were identified again by the ADC Assessment Team in 2015.

Five years later, MTC continues to seriously underperform in the areas of (1) staff training, (2) staff communication with inmates, (3) command staff communication with line staff, (4) inmate population training, (5) inmate controlled movement, (6) inmate count procedures, (7) inmate housing compliance, (8) inmate identification card compliance, (9) inmate programs, (10) security device tracking, and (11) weapons and munitions training.
Governor Ducey and Attorney General Brnovich:

I send this email message pursuant to A.R.S. Section 41-1609(E)(2) to notify you that I am declaring an emergency and the need to relocate persons who are committed to the Department of Corrections to another existing public or private facility established pursuant to A.R.S. Sections 41-1609.01 and 41-1609.02. The reason for the declaration of an emergency and need to relocate inmates is a prison riot at the Kingman complex, Cerbat Unit and Hualapai Unit.

Regards,

Charles L. Ryan
Director
602-542-5225
602-377-5430 (cell)
cryan@azcorrections.gov
July 6, 2015

Director Charles Ryan
1601 W. Jefferson St.
Phoenix, AZ 85007

Director Ryan:

Your leadership was invaluable in protecting the safety of Arizona citizens and law enforcement officials following the incidents at the Hualapai Unit this past weekend. I commend the swift response you and your officers displayed.

Now, I look to your expertise as we move forward.

After touring the unit Sunday morning, I believe it is critical that we understand how these incidents occurred and how we prevent them in the future. The public also needs to know the facts and have assurance that prisons in our state – both state-run and privately-run – are under control.

Please provide me a full and thorough review as soon as possible.

In addition to outlining what led to these incidents, please provide recommendations and next steps.

Again, thank you for your leadership and dedication to public safety. My staff and I will continue to have regular and ongoing communication with you and your department.

Sincerely,

Douglas A. Ducey
Governor
State of Arizona